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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,
Case NO.870066-CA

vs.
JAMES FLETCHER ANDERSON and
JODE W. ANDERSON,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Salt Lake
Department, finding Appellants guilty of violation of Salt Lake
City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 prohibiting the presence of an
individual under the age of 21 in an establishment licensed to
distribute draft beer.

This appeal is

taken as of right under

Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:

1

a)
19-3-9

Whether or not Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and

deny equal protection

in their application

to the

Defendants herein in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of the
State of Utah; and
b)

Whether Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-

9 must be judicially construed to allow for the employment of a
person over the age of 18, but under the age of 21, in a capacity
that does not involve the handling or dispensing of alcohol so as
to be consistent

with

the State law and to provide

equal

protection under the laws.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
United States Constitution
Amendment XIV Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof/ are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.

No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due p r o c e s s

of

l a w ; nor

deny

to any

person

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2

within

its

Amendment XXI Section 2
The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

or

importation

into

any

State,

T e r r i t o r y , or possession of the United States for delivery or use
t h e r e i n of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r s ,

in v i o l a t i o n of t h e laws

thereof, i s hereby p r o h i b i t e d .

Constitution of Utah
A r t i c l e I f Section 24 [Uniform operation of laws.]
A l l l a w s of a g e n e r a l

nature

s h a l l have uniform

operation.

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
Section 32A-1-4. Policy.
The policies of the State are:
1)

The administration of this title shall be nonpartisan

and free of partisan political influence.
2)

Alcoholic beverage control shall be operated as a public

business using sound management principles and practices.

The

business shall be governed by a commission and operated by a
department.

The business shall function with the intent of

servicing the public demand for alcoholic beverages.
3)
Control

The commission and Department of Alcoholic Beverage
shall

consumption

neither

promote

of alcoholic

nor

beverages.

3

encourage
The

the

sale

commission

or

shall

conduct, license, and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in
a manner and at prices which reasonably satisfy the public demand
and protect the public interest, including the rights of citizens
who do not wish to be involved with alcoholic products.
Section 32A-1-5. Definitions.
As used in this title:
1)

"Alcoholic beverages" means "beer" and "liquor" as the

terms are defined in this section.
. . . .

4)

"Beer", "light beer",

"malt

liquor",

or

"malted

beverages" means all products which contain 63/100 of 1% of
alcohol by volume or 1/2 of 1% of alcohol by weight, but not more
than 4% of alcohol by volume or 3.2% by weight, and are obtained
by fermentation, infusion, or decoction of any malted grain.
Beer may or may not contain hops or other vegetable products.
.

7)

"Club" and

• • .

"private

club" means

any

non-profit

corporation operating as a social club, recreational, fraternal,
or

athletic

association,

or

kindred

association

organized

primarily for the benefit of its stock holders or members.
. . . .

17)

"Liquor" means

alcohol, or alcoholic, spiritous,

vinous, fermented, malt, or other liquid, or combination of
liquids, a part of which is spiritous, vinous, or fermented, and

4

all other drinks, or drinkable liquids which contain more than
1/2 of 1% of alcohol by volume and is suitable to use for
beverage purposes.

The term "liquor" shall not include any

beverage defined as a beer, malt liquor, or malted beverage, that
has an alcohol content of less than 4%
.

21)

. . .

"Minor" means any person under the age of 21 years.
•

24)

alcohol by volume.

* • •

"Package agency" means a retail liquor

location

operated under a contractual agreement with the department, by a
person other than the state, who is authorized by the commission
to sale package liquor for consumption off the premises of the
agency.
•

29)

• . •

"Premises" means any building, enclosure, room, or

equipment used in connection with the sale, storage, service,
manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products,
unless otherwise defined in this title or in the rules adopted by
the commission.
•

38)

• . .

"Sell", "sale" and "to sale" means any transaction,

exchange, or barter whereby, for any consideration, an alcoholic
beverage is either directly or indirectly transferred, solicited,
ordered, delivered for value, or by any means or under any
pretext is promised or obtained; whether done by a person as a
5

principal, proprietor, or as an agent, servant, or employee,
unless otherwise defined in this title or the rules adopted by
the commission.
•

47)

• • •

"Wine" means any alcoholic beverage obtained by the

fermentation of the natural sugar contents of fruits, plants,
honey, or milk, or any other like substance, whether or not other
ingredients are added.

The term "liquor" includes wine as

defined herein.
Section 32A-4-2C5)
No minor shall be granted a restaurant liquor license or be
employed by a

restaurant to handle liquor.

Section 32A-4-6Q4)
No minor shall be employed by a restaurant licensee to sell
or dispense alcoholic beverages.
Section 32A-5-7(24)(e)
No minor shall be employed by any club to sell or dispense
or handle any alcoholic beverage.
Section 32A-7-6(2)(k)
No minor shall sell, serve, dispense, or anyway handle any
alcoholic beverage at the "single" event.

6

Section 32A-10-7
Cities and towns within their corporate limits, and counties
outside

of incorporated

cities and towns have the power

to

license, tax, regulate, or prohibit the sale of light beer, at
retail, in bottles, or draft.

Licenses shall not be granted to

sell beer in the proximity of any church or school, the local
authority granting a license has the

authority to determine in

each case what constitutes proximity.

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
Section 19-3-8
Presence of minors in a class
prohibited.

m

It shall be unlawful

Cm and class "D" premises
and

shall constitute

an

offense of strict liability for any person under the age of 21
years to:
a)
n

Enter or be in or about any premises licensed as a class

C" or "D" establishment, for the sale of beer, or
b)

To drink beer or any other alcoholic beverages in said

licensed premises.
c)

Any person violating any provision of this section shall

be deemed guilty of any infraction and may not be imprisoned,
but shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $299.00.
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Section 19-3-9
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of
strict liability for any licensee of a class

n

C" or class n D"

license for the sale of beer or any operator, agentf or employee
of such licensee to permit any person under the age of 21 years
to remain in or about such licensed premises.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit Court finding Appellants guilty of violation of Salt Lake
City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 prohibiting the presence of an
individual under the age of 21 in an establishment licensed to
distribute draft beer.

Findings of Fact and Judgment were filed

with the Court on February 24, 1987.
stipulated to the following facts:

The parties previously

James Fletcher Anderson is

the owner and operator of a tavern located within the confines of
Salt Lake Cityf Utah.

Jode W. Anderson, the wife of James

Fletcher Anderson, was employed in the tavern performing
functions which did not include the necessity of handling or
dispensing alcoholic beverages, but which caused her to be upon
the premises.

Jode Anderson is a person under the age of 21,

but over the age of 18.
After hearing held December 7, 1986 the Honorable Judge
Palmer of the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, Salt
Lake Department entered the Finding of Facts based upon the

8

stipulation reached between the parties and entered the following
Conclusions of Law:
1)

Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 make no

exclusion from their prohibition for a person under the age of 21
being in an establishment licensed to dispense draft beer.

This

is a status offense violated by the presence of the individual on
the premises.
2)
denying
involved
3)

The above cited Ordinances are not
equal protection

and

due process

unconstitutional

to the

Defendants

herein.
The Court need not judicially construe the Ordinances to

provide an interpretation consistent with the state law on the
subject

in

order

to

constitutionally

save

the

Ordinances.

Subsequent to the Court entering its Finding of Facts
and Conclusion

of Law, the Defendants were

found

guilty

as

chargedf and sentenced to a term of six months in the County Jail
and a fine of $100.00, said term to be suspended, and Defendants
placed upon probation for a period of six months.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Twenty-first

Amendment

of the United

States

Constitution expressly grants the individual states the power to
regulate the distribution of alcoholic substances.

While such

grant of power is express, it nevertheless remains subject to the
parameters

of

the

Fourteenth

9

Amendment

to the

Constitution

guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.

The Utah

Constitution likewise provides for equal and uniform application
of the laws of the state.

While the Utah Code does not prohibit

minors from working in establishments such as private clubs or
restaurants where alcohol, wine and beer are served. Salt Lake
City Ordinances as interpreted

in this matter

specifically

prohibit the employment of minors in any capacity in taverns and
other establishments which strictly serve beer as opposed to
other alcoholic substances.

In examining this distinction under

equal protection standards, the disparity between the treatment
of beer taverns, restaurants and private clubs in employing
persons of legal age but less than 21 years of age does not bear
a reasonable relationship to the enumerated interests of the
state in regulating the distribution and sale of alcoholic
substances.

This analysis proves true both under Federal Equal

Protection and Utah State Equal Protection analysis.

In the

alternative, Appellants argue that if the disparity between the
two sections does not render Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and
19-3-9 unconstitutional, then this Court should construe the
applicable

Salt Lake City Ordinances as limited in scope and

applicable only to patrons of the establishment and the handling,
selling or dispensing of alcoholic beverages by employees.
construction would be consistent

with

the

long

Such

recognized

importance of the right to work and the concomitant opportunity
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to achieve economic security and stability as an essential
element of constitutionally protected rights of lifef liberty and
happiness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 19-3-8 AND 19-3-9 VIOLATE
APPELLANTS' EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES
The United States Constitution specifically

reserves

to the individual states the power to regulate the consumption
and distribution of alcoholic beverages.

The Constitution of

the United States, Amendment XXI, Section 2 (ratified 1933) .
The broad sweep of the Amendment has been recognized

as

concerning something more than the normal state authority over
public health, welfare and morals.

Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor

Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 12 L.Ed.2d 350, 84 S.Ct. 1293 (1964).
Yet the Supreme Court has specifically held that the operation of
the Twenty-first Amendment does not alter the application of
equal protection standards that otherwise govern.
Boxen, 429 U.S. 190, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451

Craig v.
(1976),

rehearing denied 429 U.S. 1124, 51 L.Ed.2d 574, 97 S.Ct. 1161.
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution.
Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must
be considered in the light of the other, and in the
context of the issues and interests at stake in any
concrete case.
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. at 332, 12 L.Ed.2d 350.
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Pursuant to the power conferred upon the s t a t e of Utah
under the Twenty-first Amendment Utah has enacted the Alcoholic
Beverage C o n t r o l Act.

T i t l e 32A, Utah Code Annotated

(1985)

r e p l a c i n g former T i t l e 32 I n t o x i c a t i n g L i q u o r s Code.

Under

T i t l e 32A persons under the age of 21 are r e s t r i c t e d from s e l l i n g
or dispensing alcoholic beverages.

Sections 32A-4-6(14), 32A-5-

7(24) (e) , 32A-7-2(5), and 32A-7-6 (2) (k) Utah Code Ann.

None of

these s e c t i o n s f however, preclude the employment of persons under
t h e age of 21 from p e r f o r m i n g t a s k s w i t h i n t h e

respective

establishments t h a t do not involve the s e l l i n g or dispensing of
alcoholic

beverages.

The o n l y

absolute

prohibition

employment i s with r e s p e c t t o employment of minors in
liquor

s t o r e s and departmental

warehouses.

Section

on

state

32-1-11(5)

Utah Code Ann.
Thus, persons under the age of 21 may be employed in
r e s t a u r a n t s where liquor i s served,
can be mixed and served,
liquor is served,

p r i v a t e clubs where drinks

and at special one time events where

so l o n g a s t h e y a r e n o t i n v o l v e d i n

the

handling or dispensing of the a l c o h o l .
S e c t i o n 32A-10-7, Utah Code Ann. g r a n t s c i t i e s
towns within the corporate l i m i t s ,

and counties outside of

i n c o r p o r a t e d c i t i e s and t o w n s , t h e power t o l i c e n s e ,
r e g u l a t e , or p r o h i b i t the sale of l i g h t beer.
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the
tax,

For purposes of

T i t l e 32A, b e e r and l i g h t b e e r a r e c o n s i d e r e d
Section 32A-1-5U), Utah Code Ann.

and

synonymous.

Pursuant to t h i s

delegation

of authority, Salt Lake City

has established

a blanket

prohibition against "minors in taverns" irrespective of any
involvement with the dispensing
beverages.
9.

or selling of alcoholic

Salt Lake City Municipal Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-

The net effect of this Ordinance is to restrict persons under

the age of 21 and over the

majority age of 18 from being

employed in retail beer outlets, but allowing them to be employed
in private clubs, restaurants and special events where harder
alcohols as well as beer and wine are served.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized

that the

Fourteenth Amendment does not deny the states the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways.

Reed v. Reed,

404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229, 92 S.Ct. 251 (1971).
The equal protection clause of that Amendment does, however, deny
the states the power to legislate that different

treatment be

accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that
statute.

A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and

must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.

Id.,

cited in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 31 L.Ed.2d 349,
359, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (1972) .
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"If some persons or transactions excluded from
the operation of a law, were as to the subject matter
of the law in no differentiable class from those
i n c l u d e d w i t h i n its o p e r a t i o n , the law is
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and
unconstitutional,
Leethum v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323,
325 (Utah 1974) .
In the immediate case, persons between the age of 18
and 21 may be employed in restaurants wibh liquor licenses,
private clubs and special one events where alcoholic substances
are distributed, as long as they are not involved in such sale or
distribution.

Yet, these same persons cannot be employed by

retail beer outlets in Salt Lake City despite being similarly
circumstanced.
sale.

All of these establishments distribute beer for

All of these establishments also require that food be sold

on the premises in addition to the alcoholic substances.

Private

clubs and retail beer outlets are the most closely related
enterprises.

The main difference being that private clubs are

allowed to not only sell beer, but wine and harder alcohols.
Persons under the age of 21 can be employed in and around hard
liquor dispensing outlets but when a softer alcohol substance
such as beer is the only alcohol served, minors are barred.

Thus

the major distinction between these two enterprises runs counter
to the established policy of restriction of persons under the age
of 21 from being exposed to the sale, distribution and use of
alcoholic substances.

The classification in question herein,

therefore, does not rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the objects of the legislation.
14

Not only are persons similarly circumstances treated differently,
distinctions drawn are actually counter to the declared policies
of the state under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and are
thus rendered arbitrary and unconstitutional.
POINT II
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 19-3-8 AND 19-3-9 LIKEWISE
VIOLATE THE APPELLANTS' "EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS" UNDER
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution does not
track the equal protection language of the U.S. Constitution, but
this Section has been held to incorporate the same general
fundamental principles incorporated in the federal Equal
Protection Clause.
1984).

Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah

Under Utah Equal Protection Analysis, whether a statute

meets the requisite standards depends in the first instance upon
the objectives of the statute and whether the classifications
established provide a reasonable basis for promoting those
objectives.

Id.

A valid classification, for statutory and

constitutional purposes, must include all persons similarly
situated, and must bear a reasonable relation to the purposes to
be accomplished by the act.

Where some persons or transactions

excluded from the operation of the law are, as to its subject
matter, in no differentiable class from those included in its
operation,

the law is discriminatory in the sense of being

arbitrary and unconstitutional.

15

Continental Bank and Trust v.

Farminqton City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1979) citing Davis v^
Qqden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616 (1950), Slater v^ Salt
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 (1949) , and State v^ Mason,
94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938).
As with the analysis detailed in the foregoing Point If
persons between the ages of 18 and 21 employed in private clubsf
restaurants with liquor licenses, and special one event permits
are excluded from the operation of Salt Lake City Ordinances 193-8 and 19-3-9 yet are not logically dif ferentiable from those
persons within the purvieu of the Ordinances in question.

Any

differences which can be drawn are counter to the declared
policies of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, and the
o r d i n a n c e s are c o n s e q u e n t l y
unconstitutional.

rendered

arbitrary

and

These statutory classifications are not based

upon differences that have a reasonable relation to the policy
objectives of Title 32A, Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah
1982), but rather show an unreasonable or fanciful relationship.
Slater v^ Salt Lake City, 115 Utah.2.d at 494, 206 P.2d 153.
Such discrimination

is unreasonable

and

should

be

held

unconstitutional.
POINT III
LN THE ALTERNATIVE, SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 19-3-8 AND 19-3-9
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO EXCEPT PERSONS NOT INVOLVED LN
THE SALE OR DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOL
Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 provide an
important function in prohibiting persons between the ages of 18
16

and 21 from purchasing, selling or distributing beer in retail
beer outlets.

These Ordinances provide an important

function

and are well within the police power of the city, so long as they
are judicially construed to limit their application to patrons of
the establishment and the handling, selling or dispensing of
alcoholic beverages by employees.

Such a construction

clearly

does not serve an injustice to the Ordinances and is consistent
with the long recognized importance of the right to work and the
concomitant

opportunity

to achieve

economic

security

stability as an essential element of constitutionally
rights of life, liberty and happiness.

and

protected

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.

33, 60 L.Ed.2d 31 (1915).
CONCLUSION
Under both federal and state equal protection analysis,
Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 deprive Appellants of
their

equal

protection

guarantees

and

should

be

found

unconstitutional.

In the alternative, the subject

Ordinances

should be construed

so as to permit

of persons

the employment

between the ages of 18 and 21 in retail beer outlets so long as
they are not involved in the sale or distribution of alcoholic
substances.

Based upon these conclusions, the judgment entered

against Defendants should be reversed and the sentence as applied
withdrawn.
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